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HOW TO INTERPRET STATUTES - OR NOT:
PLAIN MEANING AND OTHER PHANTOMS*
Steven Wisotsky**
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1926 the Government alleged that Timothy McBoyle
hired a pilot to steal an airplane and fly it from Illinois to
Oklahoma. Although McBoyle denied the charge, the jury
convicted him of interstate transportation of a stolen motor
vehicle in violation of a federal statute. The operative language
of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919 defined "motor
vehicle" to include "an automobile, automobile truck,
automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled
vehicle not designed for running on rails."I
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction,
rejecting McBoyle's contentions that
the word "vehicle" includes only conveyances that travel
on the ground; that an airplane is not a vehicle but a ship;
and that, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase
"any other self-propelled vehicle" cannot be construed to
include an airplane.
Canvassing several dictionaries, the court of appeals determined
that "vehicle" means "[a]ny receptacle, or means of transport, in
which something is carried or conveyed, or travels.",3 It
*A brief piece by the author on this topic was published in the Florida Bar Journal in
January 2009. See How to Interpret Statutes-orNot: The Phantom of Plain Meaning, 83

Fla. Bar J. 43 (Jan. 2009).
**Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. Professor
Wisotsky is the author of Professional Judgment on Appeal: Bringing and Opposing

Appeals (2d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2009). Nathaniel Dutt (NSU Law 2011) and
Aaron Humphrey (NSU Law 2011) contributed to the editing of this article.
1. McBoyle v. US., 43 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1930).
2. Id.
3. Id. (quoting Century Dictionary).
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concluded that
the derivation and the definition of the word "vehicle"
indicate that it is sufficiently broad to include any means or
device by which persons or things are carried or
transported, and it is4 not limited to instrumentalities used
for traveling on land.
The court acknowledged ambiguity in the statute insofar as
a land-based vehicle "may be the limited or special meaning of
the word.",5 But the court noted by way of example that "[w]e do
not think it would be inaccurate to say that a ship or vessel is a
vehicle of commerce." 6 Indeed, as the court pointed out,
[a]n airplane is self-propelled, by means of a gasoline
motor. It is designed to carry passengers and freight from
place to place.

.

. . It furnishes a rapid means for

transportation of persons and comparatively light articles of
freight and express. It therefore serves the same general
purpose as an automobile, automobile truck, or motorcycle.
It is of the same general kind or class as the motor vehicles

specifically enumerated in the statutory definition and,
therefore, construing an airplane to come within the general
term, "any other self-propelled
vehicle,"
does not offend
•
•.7
against the maxim of ejusdem generis.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
court of appeals.8 Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous
Court, held that the statute making it a federal crime to move a
stolen "motor vehicle" in interstate commerce did not apply to a
stolen airplane, although he acknowledged that "[n]o doubt
etymologically it is possible to use the word [gvehicle] to signify
a conveyance working on land, water or air." But the Supreme
Court was otherwise persuaded:
It is impossible to read words that so carefully enumerate
the different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference
of any kind to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Circuit

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
Id. at 26. Indeed, that is the "plain meaning" of the word vehicle, as the Tenth
had found by both "derivation and definition." McBoyle, 43 F.2d at 274.
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that usage
more and more precisely confines to a different
l0
class.
The Court alluded to but did not explicitly invoke familiar
maxims or canons of construction that were seemingly
applicable. It did not, for example, directly apply the doctrine of
ejusdem generis to narrow the broad language "any other selfpropelled vehicle" to the grouping of ground-based vehicles
enumerated by the statute." And it did not explicitly invoke the
tool of judicial resort to legislative history to interpret
ambiguous statutes; there is only a passing observation that
airplanes "were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in
Congress. 1 2 Nor did it explicitly invoke the familiar rule of
lenity to resolve a statutory ambiguity against the Government
in a criminal prosecution, although the dissenting judge on the
court of appeals had done so. 3
The Supreme Court chose the rationale that contemporary
usage had effectively narrowed the plain meaning of "motor
vehicle" in the dictionary sense to land-based vehicles: "But in
everyday syeech 'vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing moving
on land."' Building on that linguistic premise, the Court relied
additionally upon the principle of fair play:
[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand,
of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To
make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be
clear. 15
This analysis, based on unfairness to McBoyle as an individual,
is dubious because he clearly knew that he was conspiring to
commit and was committing (as an aider and abettor) the ancient
common law crime of larceny. Every sane person knows that it

10. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27.
11. The Tenth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion, determining instead that
planes were of "the same general class as an automobile and a motorcycle." McBoyle, 43
F.2d at 274.
12. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26.
13. McBoyle, 43 F.2d at 276 (Cotteral, J., dissenting) (stating that "[a] prevailing rule is
that a penal statute is to be construed strictly against an offender and it must state clearly
the persons and acts denounced").
14. McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 26.
15. Id. at 27.
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is wrong to steal. 16 The only colorable claim of lack of fair
warning was whether a reasonable person would know that he
was committing a crime against the United States in addition to
the crime(s) against state law. Analogy from other (albeit later)
cases suggests that knowledge of the federal character17 of the
offense is not an element for which mens rea is required.
The only solid basis for the Court's decision in McBoyle is
a rejection of a foolish literalism based on the apparent
congressional intent in 1926, when aviation was in its infancy
and "motor vehicle" would have conjured up only images of
ground-based vehicles. Inevitably, reaching that conclusion
involves some consideration of the maxim ejusdem generis. The
frustrating thing for judges and lawyers is that the Tenth Circuit
had considered and rejected precisely that factor in affirming the
conviction, leaving later courts to puzzle over the push and pull
between the court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
There are several lessons to be drawn from this opinion.
The first is that superficially clear statutory language may upon
concentrated analysis prove ambiguous, so that even a term as
simple, familiar, and concrete as "motor vehicle" becomes
subject to interpretation. The second is that in the search for

statutory meaning, context trumps literalism. In other words,
there is no plain meaning without context. This latter point helps
to make sense out of what is otherwise the dialectical
inconclusiveness of the primary canons of statutory
18 By way of example, a few familiar
interpretation.
dueling
maxims are adduced
below.

16. Larceny is malum in se, a Ten Commandments crime. See Foster v. State, 596 So.
2d 1099, 1103, 1103 n. 2 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 1992) (Cowart, J., dissenting) (citing
Deuteronomy 5:17: "Neither shalt thou steal").
17. Cf U.S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975) (holding both that the crime of
assaulting a federal officer does not require proof that defendant knew victim was a federal
officer and that there is "no risk of unfairness" in such rule).
18. The same principles generally apply to the interpretation of other forms of positive
law. As the Florida Supreme Court held generations ago, "[t]he rules used in construing
statutes are in general applicable in construing the provisions of a Constitution." State ex
rel. McKay v. Keller, 191 So. 542, 545 (Fla. 1939). And it has also noted that "[t]he
fundamental object in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to
the intentions of the framers and adopters, and constitutional provisions must be interpreted
in such a manner as to fulfill this intention rather than to defeat it." State ex rel. Dade
County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130, 135 (Fla. 1969).
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II. THE OSTENSIBLE RULES
A. The PlainMeaning of a Statute Controls-OrNot
This familiar canon is widely accepted in both state and
federal courts, along with an exception. Thus, the plain meaning
of a statute controls "unless this leads to an unreasonable result
or a result contrary to legislative intent." 19 A more detailed
statement of the rule and counter-rule is this:
Under some circumstances ... a court may look beyond the
language of a statute. If a literal reading of a statute
produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, or
results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as
absurd, i.e., that is so gross as to shock the general moral or
common sense, then we can look beyond an unambiguous
history to divine its
statute and
20 consult legislative
meaning."
B. "Shall" is Mandatory, "May" is Permissive-OrNot
This is a convention in both state and federal courts arising
from ordinary English usage. The plain meaning of "may"
denotes a permissive term, but
if reading "may" as permissive leads to an unreasonable
result or one contrary to legislative intent, courts may look
to the context in which "may" is used and the legislature's
whether "may" should be read as a
intent to determine
21
mandatory term.
And the Supreme Court itself has held that
[t]he word "may," when used in a statute, usually implies
some degree of discretion. This common-sense principle of
statutory construction is by no means invariable, however,
...and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent

19. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So.
2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 1996)).
20. U.S. v. Crabtree, 565 F.3d 887, 889 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigmon Coal Co. v.

Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000)).
21. Sloban v. Fla.Bd. of Pharmacy,982 So. 2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2008).

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

to the contrary or by obvious
2 2 inferences from the structure
and purpose of the statute.

C. "And " is Conjunctive, "Or" is Disjunctive-OrNot
This canon is, again, a function of conventional English
usage and is widely followed in state and federal courts. "In its
elementary sense the word 'or' is a disjunctive particle that
marks an alternative, generally corresponding to 'either,' as
'either this or that. ,,23 But there are also some exceptions,
situations "in which the conjunction 'or' is held equivalent in
meaning to the copulative conjunction 'and.' 24 As the D.C.
Circuit has opined,
[n]ormally, of course, "or" is to be accepted for its
disjunctive connotation, and not as a word interchangeable
with "and." But this canon is not inexorable, for sometimes
a strict grammatical construction will frustrate legislative
intent. That, we are convinced, is2 precisely what will occur
here unless "or" is read as "and." ?
This dichotomy has long been recognized. In 1866, the
Supreme Court stated that a statutory use of the word "and"
could express the ordinary, conjunctive meaning but could also
signify the disjunctive "or": "In the construction of statutes, it is
the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of the
legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to
construe
'or' as meaning 'and,' and again 'and' as meaning
'or.' ' 26 The Court continued by noting that "[a]s is often the
case in statutes, though the intention is clear, the words used to
express it may be ill chosen,"
27 and the Court held that "and"
28
case.
this
in
"or"
meant
In De Sylva v. Ballentine,29 the Court interpreted a section
of the Copyright Act, which stated "or if such author, widow,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

U.S. v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (footnotes and citations omitted).
Pompano Horse Club v. State, 111 So. 801, 805 (Fla. 1927).
Id.
U.S. v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
U.S. v. Fisk, 70 U.S. 445, 447 (1866).
Id.
Id. at 447-48.
De Sylva v. Ballentine,351 U.S. 570 (1956).
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widower or children be not living, then the author's executors"
were the affected parties. 30 The Court's analysis started "with
the proposition that the word 'or' is often used as a careless
substitute for the word 'and'; that is, it is often used in phrases
31
where 'and' would express the thought with greater clarity."
The Court then held that although "[t]he clause would be more
accurate... were it to read 'author, widow or widower, and
children[J" there lacks any evidence that32 Congress intended the
word "or" to have a disjunctive meaning.
D. PenalStatutes Should Be Strictly Construed-OrNot
This is yet another example of a dichotomous "rule" of
construction of uncertain meaning and inconsistent application.
There are in fact at least two different rules. 3 3 The traditional
rule emanated from the English common law at a time when
most felonies were punishable by death. The rule thus avoided
imposition of capital punishment when the conduct in question
was not clearly prohibited by law. For example, Justice William
Blackstone, in his influential 1769 treatise, referred to a criminal
statute penalizing the theft of sheep "or other cattle," and noted
that
the act was held to extend to nothing but mere sheep. And
therefore, in the next sessions, it was found necessary to
make another statute... extending the former to bulls,
cows, oxens, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs by
name.

30. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 573. Cases in which the Supreme Court held that "or" means "and" include
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Fed. Power Commn., 420 U.S. 395, 417-18 (1975);
Swearingen v. U.S., 161 U.S. 446, 450 (1896); and Union Ins. Co. v. U.S., 73 U.S. 759,
764-65 (1868). Cases in which other federal courts held that "and" means "or" include U.S.
v. Cumbee, 84 F. Supp. 390, 391 (D. Minn. 1949); U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F. Supp. 13, 15
(N.D. Okla. 1939); and Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Skipper, 115 F. 69, 71-72 (8th Cir.

1902).
32. De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 574 (emphasis in original).
33. See Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971 (2007) (discussing four categories of statutory interpretive
methodologies: textualism, legislative intent, canons, and pragmatism).
34. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. 1, *88 (available
at Yale L. Sch., Lillian Goldman L. Lib., Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
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Blackstone noted the judges' inability to determine what else
was covered by "cattle" under the statute, although Parliament
clearly intended to include other English farm animals.
This rule of strict construction found its way into early
American case law through Chief Justice Marshall:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is
perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is
founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial
department. It is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to
35
define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
The rule required examination of the statute's text, for "[t]he
intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they
employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no
room for construction." 36 Then the Court expounded what might
be called the facial approach: "To determine that a case is within
the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say
so."53 7 Thus, the Court held that the statutory language of "on the
high seas" did not encompass a homicide committed on an
inland river, even if other sections of the statute indicated
congressional intent that the federal courts have jurisdiction,
because "probability is not a guide
which a court, in construing a
38
penal statute, can safely take.
Less than a half century after Chief Justice Marshall's
words, the Supreme Court began to deviate from the traditional
or facial rule, admitting first that "[w]e are not unmindful that
penal laws are to be construed strictly.' 39 But the Court then
century/blackstone-intro.asp#2 (accessed Oct. 28, 2009; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process)).
35. U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (analyzing whether statute's language of
"on the high seas" granted federal court jurisdiction over manslaughter committed on a

ship anchored in a river).
36. Id. at 95-96.
37. Id. at 96.
38. Id. at 105; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm.&
Mary L. Rev. 57, 89-94 (1998) (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's incorporation of the
rule of lenity into the American court system).
39. U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 395 (1868) (analyzing whether the statute's language
of "any banker, broker, or other persons not an authorized depository of the public
moneys" includes a clerk in the office of the U.S. assistant treasurer so that the clerk is
subject to the penalties prescribed in the statute for misconduct by officers).
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declared that
[t]he proper course in all cases is to adopt that sense of the
words which best harmonizes with the context, and
promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the
legislature. The rule of strict construction is not violated by
permitting the words of the statute to have 40their full
meaning, or the more extended of two meanings.
This contextual approach to the rule of lenity 4 I obviously affords
far less protection to a charged defendant than does the common
law rule. But this was a white collar crimes prosecution, and the
absence of the death penalty and the Court's perceived need to
protect the public probably influenced the decision.
The Court in United States v. Harris42 reverted to the facial
or traditional rule:
[I]t still remains that the intention of a penal statute must be
found in the language actually used, interpreted according
to its fair and obvious meaning. It is not permitted to
courts... to attribute inadvertence or oversight to the
legislature when enumerating the classes of persons who
are subjected to a penal enactment, nor to depart from the
settled meaning of words or phrases in order to bring
persons not named or distinctly described within the
supposed purpose of the statute.43
In reversing the conviction, the Court closed by quoting Chief
Justice Marshall's language in Wiltberger and held that the
implied intention of Congress was inadequate to overcome the
express words of the statute.
But nine years later in United States v. Corbett,44 the Court
tacked back to the contextual approach of Hartwell: "The rule of
strict construction does not require that the narrowest technical
40. Id. at 396.
41. Id. at 395 ("The context of the section and the language of the clause both sustain
this view of the subject. If this be not the proper construction, then the consequence would
follow that in this elaborate section, obviously intended to cover the whole ground of
frauds by receivers, custodians, and disbursers of the public moneys, of every grade of
office, punishment is provided for only one of the offences which the act designates. There
is no principle, which, properly applied, requires or would warrant such a conclusion.").
42. 177 U.S. 305 (1900).
43. Id. at 309 (analyzing whether the statute's language of "any company, owner, or
custodian of such animals" includes a railroad receiver to whom the statute's criminal

penalties were sought to be applied).
44. 215 U.S. 233 (1909).

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute, in
disregard of their context, and in frustration of the obvious
legislative intent. '45 As the Court noted, "[tihe rule of strict
construction is not violated by permitting the words of the
statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two
meanings ... but the words should be taken
' 46 in such a sense ...
as will best manifest the legislative intent.
None of the considerations animating the rule of lenity at
common law were observed in Corbett:
[T]he rule thus stated affords us ground for extending a
penal statute beyond its plain meaning. But it inculcates

that a meaning which is within the text and within its clear
intent is not to be departed from because, by resorting to a
narrow and technical interpretation of particular words, the
plain meaning may be4 7distorted and the obvious purpose of
the law be frustrated.
This diluted version of the rule of lenity continued to be applied
in subsequent cases. "The canon in favor of strict construction is
not an inexorable command to override common sense and
evident statutory purpose. ' 48 And again:
[T]hat "rule [of lenity]" . . . only serves as an aid for

resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one...
The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of
construing what Congress has expressed, not at the
beginning as49an overriding consideration of being lenient to
wrongdoers.

45. Id. at 242 (analyzing whether the statute's language of "any agent appointed to
examine the affairs of any such bank" includes the Comptroller of the Currency when such
an agent would be required to examine the books and papers of the bank, and this case
involved a false entry as to the condition of the bank in a report).
46. Id. (quotingHartwell, 73 U.S. at 396) (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
48. US. v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948) (analyzing whether the statute's language of
"held" signifies that the defendant's additional sentence for attempting to escape will begin
upon the expiration of his current sentence being served or at the expiration of the
aggregate term of his consecutive sentences then in effect, of which the one currently being
served is his first sentence of three).
49. Callanan v. US., 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (analyzing whether the defendant, who
was convicted under the statute of the crimes of obstructing commerce by extortion and
conspiracy to commit extortion, was convicted of two distinct crimes for which two
separate sentences might be administered) (footnote omitted).
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Again, the values of protecting individual liberty and respecting
the separation of powers are subordinated to considerations of
public policy. 5

5

United States v. Bass51 departed from this broader contextbased approach and returned again to the facial or traditional
approach, holding that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity., 52 For the
defendant to be held liable, the courts "require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.", 5 The
rationale echoes Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Wiltberger,
stemming as it does from the principle that lenity provides
potential defendants a fair warning of the conduct that Congress
intends to punish, and also assures the separation of powers so
that only
• 54 the legislature-and not the courts-defines criminal
activity. But the Bass ruling did not establish a new dominance
of the traditional rule. On the contrary, in the same year the
Court held that "[i]f an absolutely literal reading of a statutory
provision is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional
55
purpose, a less literal construction must be considered.,
The tug of war over the rule of lenity shifted ground
dramatically in Huddleston v. United States. There the Court
failed to apply the rule of lenity because it "perceive[d] no
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure

50. See e.g. Rewis v. US., 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (indicating that ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of lenity); U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957) (noting that criminal
statutes are to be construed strictly, but that courts need not use narrowest possible
construction); U.S. v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) (same), overruled on other grounds,
Hubbardv. U.S., 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
51. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
52. Id. at 347 (citing Rewis, among other cases, and analyzing whether the statute's
reference to one "who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting
commerce . . . any firearm" requires the government to prove that the possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon is connected to interstate commerce).
53. Id. (quoting US. v. Universal C.IT Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)).
54. See id. at 348.
55. U.S. v. Campos-Serrano,404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971) (analyzing whether the statute's
language of "uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa,
permit, or document, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made"
includes the defendant's possession of a counterfeit alien registration receipt card).
56. 415 U.S. 814 (1974).

332
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of the Act.",57 The Court cited no precedent for thus raising the
bar. And this was not an aberration. The Court repeated the new
standard in later cases, by holding, for example, that "[t]he rule
of lenity is not applicable unless there is a 'grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act." 5 For
lenity to apply, the statute must "produce a result so 'absurd or
glaringly unjust,' 59. . . as to raise a 'reasonable doubt' about
Congress' intent."

The inconsistency of the Court's lenity opinions from case
to case was compounded by the internal inconsistency of a
single justice from case to case. For example, Justice Thurgood
Marshall wrote two opinions in the same year in which he
diminished the importance of the rule of lenity in the hierarchy
of statutory construction. 60 In May of 1990, he wrote that
"longstanding principles of lenity... preclude our resolution of
the ambiguity against petitioner on the basis of general
61
declarations of policy in the statute and legislative history."
But in December 1990, he shifted emphasis, stating that "we
have always reserved lenity for those situations in which a
reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even
after resort to 'the language and structure,
legislative history,
62
statute."
the
of
policies'
motivating
and
In the 1990s, the Court's inconsistency in applying the rule
of lenity was exacerbated by splits among the justices. United
States v. R.L.C., 63 for example, displayed a high degree of
57. Id. at 831 (analyzing whether the statutory language-"acquisition" and "sale or
other disposition"-was applicable to the defendant's redemption of firearms from a
pawnbroker who was a registered firearms dealer).
58. Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (quoting Huddleston in analysis of
whether the statute's language of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of... LSD" required that the weight of the carrier medium be included when determining
the appropriate sentencing for trafficking in LSD).
59. Id. at 463-64 (citations omitted).
60. See Moskal v. U.S., 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (analyzing whether a person who
knowingly procures genuine vehicle titles that incorporate fraudulently tendered odometer
readings receives those titles "knowing [them] to have been falsely made"); Hughey v.
US., 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (analyzing whether statute's provisions allowed a court to order
a defendant charged with multiple offenses but convicted of only one to make restitution
for losses related to the other alleged offenses).
61. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 422.
62. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
63. 503 U.S. 291 (1992) (analyzing whether Congress intended courts to treat upper
limit of penalty as "authorized" in case involving juveniles convicted as adults when proper
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fragmentation among the Justices, even while reaching a lenient

reading of the statute at issue. The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Souter and joined in part by the Chief Justice and
Justices White and Stevens, attained this result despite a broader
gauge of statutory meaning, relying on the statute's legislative
history and implied congressional purpose. The plurality
declared that
lenity does not always require the "narrowest" construction,
and our cases have recognized that a broader construction
may be permissible on the basis of nontextual factors that
make clear the legislative intent where
it is within the fair
64
meaning of the statutory language.
Justice Scalia, writing the primary concurring opinion,
attacked Justice Souter's use of legislative history to clarify
statutory ambiguity. 65 "In my view it is not consistent with the

rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous penal statute
against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative
history, ' 66 he wrote, taking the position that a criminal statute
must speak "plainly and unmistakably., 67 Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion agreed that "the use of legislative history to
construe an otherwise ambiguous penal statute against a criminal
defendant is difficult to reconcile with the rule of lenity. ' '68 But,
he emphasized, "the rule [of lenity] is not triggered merely
because a statute appears textually ambiguous on itsface."69 The
Court should then resort to its "rules of construction powerful
enough to make clear an otherwise ambiguous penal statute."
In yet another 1990s decision consistent with the view
expressed by Justice Thomas in R.L. C., the Court held that
"[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity.., is not
sufficient to warrant application of that rule, for most statutes
application of mandated sentencing guideline in adult case would bar imposition up to the

limit).
64. Id. at 306, n. 6.
65. Justice Scalia has expressed himself on statutory interpretation in Antonin Scalia, A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton U. Press 1997), which
was widely reviewed when first published. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism,
the Unknown Ideal? 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509 (1998).
66. R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307.
67. Id. at 310 (quoting U.S. v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917)).
68. Id. at 311.

69. Id. (emphasis in original).
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are ambiguous to some degree," but rather "[tlo invoke the rule
[of lenity], we must conclude that there is a 'grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty' in the statute." 70 To avoid the application of strict
construction, "[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, 'after seizing
everything from which aid can be derived,'

. . .

we7can
make 'no
1

more than a guess as to what Congress intended."'
These opinions diminished the protections afforded by the
rule of lenity far below the level articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wiltberger and in the text of other like-minded
opinions. They reduced the rule of lenity to a secondary doctrine
of statutory construction, ranking legislative history and
congressional policy as more important and more determinative
than statutory clarity and certainty.
The impaired vitality of the rule of lenity is exemplified by
the Court's decision on a gun possession charge in Caron v.
United States. 72 The majority held that the "petitioner's
approach yields results contrary to a likely, and rational,
congressional policy,

' 73

and pointed out that

[t]he rule of lenity is not invoked by a grammatical
possibility. It does not apply if the ambiguous reading
relied on is an implausible reading of the congressional
purpose... [and] petitioner's 74reading is not plausible
enough to satisfy this condition.
In dissent, Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Souter examined the
plain meaning of the statutory text to conclude that the rule of
lenity was applicable because
the alleged ambiguity does not result from a mere
grammatical possibility; it exists because of an
interpretation that.., both accords with a natural reading

70. Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (analyzing whether statute's
language of "carries a firearm" is limited to carrying of firearm on the person, or also
applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including
in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car); see also Lawrence M. Solan, The New
Textualists'New Text, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 2027 (2005).
71. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138 (quoting US. v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
72. 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (analyzing whether federal handgun restriction makes
convictions under state law count under federal law prohibiting those convicted of violent
felonies from possessing firearms).
73. Id. at 315.
74. Id. at 316.
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language and is consistent with the statutory
of the statutory
75
purpose.
Again, we have an approach that fuses elements of the textualist
and contextualist approaches.
In 2008, with two new putatively conservative justices
sitting, the Court decided United States v. Santos,76 in which the
defendant was convicted of running an illegal gambling
business, two counts of conspiracy (one to run an illegal
gambling business and one to launder money), and two counts
of money-laundering. Santos moved for post-conviction relief
on the three money-laundering convictions on the ground that
the money-laundering statute's use of the term "proceeds" was
ambiguous, requiring the Court to apply the rule of lenity. The
Court agreed and77 reversed the three convictions involving
money-laundering.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined
by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, and in part by Justice Thomas,
began by noting that the term "proceeds" was not defined by the
statute and also noting that "[w]hen a term is undefined, we give
it its ordinary meaning." 78 Next, the Court examined the moneylaundering statute as a whole because "context gives meaning,
[and] we cannot say the money-laundering statute is truly
ambiguous until we consider 'proceeds' not in isolation but as it
is used in the federal money-laundering statute. 7 9 But the Court
refused to impute a particular congressional intent to the
definition of "proceeds" because the courts "do not play the part
of a mind reader," and "[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary
the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity."8 ° After
analyzing "proceeds," then, the plurality concluded that
[u]nder either of the word's ordinary definitions, all
provisions of the federal money-laundering statute are

75. Id. at 319.
76. __ U.S. - 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008) (analyzing whether statutory language of
"proceeds" refers to profits or gross receipts under federal money-laundering statute where
the defendant is convicted of operating an illegal lottery/gambling business).
77. Id.at__, 128 S.Ct. at 2025-31.
128 S.Ct. at 2024.
78. Id.at
79. Id.
80. Id. at __, 128 S.Ct. at 2026 (quoting Bell v. U.S., 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
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coherent; no provisions are redundant; and the statute is not
rendered utterly absurd. From the face of the statute, there
is no more reason to think that "proceeds" means "receipts"
than there is to think that "proceeds" means "profits."
Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the
defendant. The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal
laws to be
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected
81
to them.

Then the plurality succinctly stated the rationale for the
"venerable" rule of lenity, noting that it
not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no
citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a
statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to
punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the
weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce
Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from
making criminal law in Congress's stead. Because the
"profits" definition of "proceeds" is always more
defendant-friendly than the "receipts" definition,
the rule of
82
lenity dictates that it should be adopted.
There were two dissenting opinions in Santos. The
principal dissenting opinion by Justice Alito (joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Kennedy and Breyer), conceded that the
term "proceeds" has more than one meaning but declined "to
abandon any effort at interpretation and summon in the rule of
lenity." 84 It criticized the plurality for being "quick to pronounce
the term hopelessly ambiguous and thus to invoke the rule of
lenity." 85 In the dissenters' view, the Court should have
analyzed the traditional meaning of "proceeds" in the context of
86
athemoney-laundering
statute.
The dissentbecause
then concluded
that
rule of lenity was
not applicable
the statute's

81. Id. at - 128 S. Ct. at 2025.
82. Id.
83. The other dissenting opinion was by Justice Breyer.
84. Id. at 2036.
85. Id. at 2035.
86. Id. at 2036. The dissent argued that other money laundering statutes commonly
define "proceeds" as "the total amount brought in," citing an international treaty, fourteen
state statutes, and the Model Money Laundering Act. Furthermore, "the total amount
brought in" definition serves the two primary purposes of money-laundering statutes:
deterring criminal activity by preventing the criminals from enjoying money earned
through illegal acts and inhibiting the growth of criminal enterprises. See id. at 2036-38.
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context, its legislative history, and Congress's stated purpose for
enacting it, when combined with traditional interpretations of
other similar statutes, all support
87 a definition of "proceeds" that
equates it with "gross receipts."
Although the Santos Court mustered five votes for the
majority's application of the rule of lenity (with Justice Stevens
supplying the fifth vote partly on that basis), its lesson was
muddled by later decisions in which some justices seemed to
change positions.
In United States v. Hayes,88 the majority analyzed the
language and structure of a statute, as well as the legislative
history and congressional intent, in order to determine whether
the phrase "a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" covered
a state misdemeanor battery where the state statute did not
require proof of a domestic relationship as an element of the
predicate offense, although it in fact existed in defendant's case.
The Court concluded that "Congress' less-than-meticulous
drafting ... hardly shows that the legislators meant to exclude
from [the statute's] firearm possession prohibition [those]
convicted under generic assault or battery provisions."89 As the
Court put it,
"[T]he touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory
ambiguity." . . . We apply the rule "only when, after
consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, we
are left with an ambiguous statute." . . . [The statute's]
definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,"
we acknowledge, is not a model of the careful drafter's art.
.... But neither is it "grievous[ly] ambigu[ous]." . . . The
text, context, purpose, and what little there is of drafting
history all point in the same direction: Congress defined
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to include an
offense "committed by" a person who had a specified
domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the
the domestic
misdemeanor statute itself designates
90
relationship as an element of the crime.
87. Id. at 2045.
-, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (2009).
88. -U.S.
89. Id. at
, 129 S. Ct. at 1085.
90. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1088-89 (internal citations omitted); see also Jonathan R.
Siegel, What Statutory DraftingErrors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation,69 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 309 (2001).
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The dissent, written by the Chief Justice and joined by
Justice Scalia (who had taken opposite sides in Santos), also
examined the statute's language, context, intent, and legislative
history. The Chief Justice concluded that the rule of lenity
should be applied, for if the rule
means anything, it is that an individual should not go to jail
for failing to conduct a 50-state survey or comb through
obscure legislative history. Ten years in jail is too much to
hinge on the will-o'-the-wisp
of statutory meaning pursued
91
by the majority.
Once again, the clarity of the common law rule, focusing
on the statutory language alone, was compromised by the
willingness of both the majority and the dissenting justices to go
beyond the face of the statute to consider also its context,
purpose, and legislative history. The reliance expectations of
citizens and the cause of predictability in judicial decisions were
both diminished.
The last decision of the Court on lenity at the writing of this
article was Dean v. United States.92 The majority opinion,
written by the Chief Justice and joined by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg, Alito, and Scalia, reiterated the
"grievous ambiguity" standard of Huddleston:
The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity.., is not
sufficient to warrant application of that rule [of lenity], for
most statutes are ambiguous to some degree ... [and] [t]o
invoke the rule, we must conclude that93 there is a grievous
ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.
The majority concluded that the text of the statute did not
contain any words of limitation regarding the defendant's state
of mind and so did not require proof of intent. 94 Therefore, there
was no need to apply the rule of lenity because the statutory
language, context, and structure did not leave the statute

91. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1093.
92.
U.S. __,
129 S.Ct. 1849 (2009) (analyzing whether the statute at issue
requires proof of intent when gun is discharged in course of violent or drug-trafficking
crime, thus invoking ten-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement).
93. Id. at - 129 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Muscarello v. US., 524 U.S. 125 (1998)).
94. See id. at__, 129 S. Ct. at 1853-54.
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grievously ambiguous.95 The dissenting opinions, written by
Justices Stevens and Breyer, who had taken opposite positions in
Santos, noted that because Congress did not explicitly provide
for or against an intent requirement, the Court should have
applied the rule of lenity and erred on the side of exclusion-not
order to provide fair warning to potential
inclusion-in
96
offenders.

The lesson of these cases is that the rule of lenity is a
highly flexible guide that produces uncertain and unpredictable
results. The Court itself cannot agree on the proper role and
weight of the rule or even its proper definition. 97 Is it triggered
by facial ambiguity or only by grievous ambiguity? Should the
Court go behind the words of the statute to find its meaning?
Even Justices Scalia and Thomas, who so often agree in matters
of criminal law and procedure, do not share common ground.
Worse, judging by the admittedly unrefined standard of whether
individual justices vote in each case for the government or the
defendant, it appears98 that they take inconsistent positions from
one case to the next.
III. WHAT IS A LAWYER OR A JUDGE TO Do?9 9

The fatal flaw in these dichotomous directives is that there
is no built-in mechanism for determining which is which:
129 S. Ct. at 1856 ("In this case, the statutory text and structure
95. See id. at __,
convince us that the discharge provision does not contain an intent requirement.").
96. See id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1856-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting, and Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
97. See generally Zachary Price, The Rule ofLenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham
L. Rev. 885 (2004) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the rule, its interpretation,
and its application).
98. Justice Marshall's reversal of position is noted above, as is the Chief Justice's
apparent switch of sides from Santos to Hayes. See nn. 58-60, 82-85, 89 and accompanying
text. As a further example, in Santos Justice Stevens applied the rule of lenity, but in Hayes
disagreed with its application because the text, context, purpose, and legislative history all
supplied enough information to enable him to find the poorly written statute
comprehensible, or at least not "grievously ambiguous." See Santos, - U.S. at __, 128
S. Ct. at 2033 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and noting that "the rule of lenity
may weigh in the determination" ); Hayes, __ U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1082, 1089
(indicating that Stevens, J., joined the opinion of the Court, in which the rule of lenity was
not applied because the statute at issue was not "grievously ambiguous"). His position in
Dean adds yet another nuance.
99. Cf Rick Sims, What Appellate Judges Do, 7 J. App. Prac. & Process 193 (2005).
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whether the putative "rule" or its "exception" applies in a
particular case. One cannot tell without resort to something
extrinsic whether "shall" is to be read as "may"; whether "and"
is to be read as "or"; whether plain meaning controls; or whether
strict construction applies. It is impossible for the advocate to
know in advance whether the canons of construction will predict
decision, as distinguished from helping to explain it after the
fact. And a judge approaching such a case is left at sea in the
search for statutory meaning without reliance upon something
beyond the canons.
This insight is not original to the author; it was first
published nearly seventy years ago by Karl Llewellyn.' 00 On the
dualistic nature of the standard tools of statutory interpretation,
Llewellyn was quite blunt about what Legal Realists might term
judge-speak: "[T]he accepted convention still, unhappily,
requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning could
exist. Hence there are two opposing
on almost every
point.''11 In other words, like a variant canons
of Newton's Third Law
of Motion, for every canon there is an equal and opposite canon.
The state of the analytical art has not advanced much beyond
this dialectic. As Llewellyn said, the canons are "still needed
tools of argument" and every lawyer must know them all. But
they do not, and indeed they cannot, decide the hard cases.
In this regard, appellate opinions have been on the whole
remarkably unreflective about the inherent ambiguity of written
language. Oral, in-person communication is infinitely richer in
nuance and detail arising from the meaning(s) imparted by the
personae and relationship of the speakers, body language, facial
expression, proximity, gestures, tone of voice, rhythm,
emphases, pauses, pacing, articulation, inflection, and more.
Although much oral communication relates to simple subjects or
tasks, even in complex and sustained presentations, like an
appellate oral argument or a law school lecture, a speaker
receives almost instantaneous signals of comprehension,

100. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 521-35
(Little, Brown 1960) (Appendix C: Canons on Statutes), a book described by former Yale
Law School Dean Anthony Kronman as "the best account of common-law adjudication
that any American has ever offered." Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 211 (Belknap
Press 1993).
101. Llewellyn, supra n. 100, at 521.
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confusion, or doubt from his interlocutors. Even if only one

person is speaking, oral communication is reciprocal, an
ongoing feedback loop of communication.
A written text, by contrast, is much more limited in its
reach and power. 1 2 "The printed word is presented to us in a
linear way, with syntax supreme in conveying the sense of the
words in their order. We read privately, mentally listening to the
writer's voice and translating the writer's thoughts."' °3 Statutes
face the additional expressive challenge of universality, trying to
regulate (or exempt) every foreseeable occurrence or omission
of a certain kind or class.
The reticence of judges to be more explicit about the
interpretive process and their reliance upon "accepted
conventional vocabulary"' 4 is no doubt traditional. It is also
professional. Judges are not linguists or grammarians, although
they are of necessity arbiters of language. Social and political
constraints apply to the degree of candor in their opinions.
Black-letter high-school civics, reinforced by the cable
television commentariat, emphasizes a rather mechanical
separation of powers in which judges merely apply positive law.
Judges are like umpires, asserted the Chief Justice during his
Senate confirmation hearings, a position repeated in substance
by Justice Sotomayor during hers. Since the era of the Warren
Court, judicial lawmaking has fallen into such political disrepute
that a combination of denial and pretense is now the only
politically acceptable position. Our inheritance of centuries of
judge-made common law on the most fundamental matters of
life and death is largely ignored or repudiated.
A more candid evaluation of the challenge of interpreting
statutes would acknowledge that precision in statutory drafting
is aspiration rather than reality, becoming more difficult as the
complexity of the subject under regulation increases. Judges are
necessary as translators of the statutory language in each casespecific context as it arises. They mediate the meaning of
102. For a more detailed analysis and discussion of the differences between-and the
different strengths of--oral and written argument, see Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral
Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District Judge's Perspective on their History,
Function, andFuture, 10 J. App. Prac. & Process 247 (2009).
103. Lynne Truss, Eats, Shoots & Leaves 180 (Profile Books 2003).
104. Llewellyn, supra n. 100, at 521.
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statutes, as any reader must do. 10 5 There is no other possibility.
How, then, should they proceed?
In truth, all meaning is contextual. The meaning of
individual words may, of course, be clear: "A fundamental
canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning.'" 106 But meaning arises also from syntax, the
interrelationship of words living, in Judge Learned Hand's
phrase, "a communal existence." 10 7 Readers experience the
meaning of each word informing the others and "all in their
aggregate tak[ing] their purport from the setting in which they
are used.', 10 8 Thus, the overall meaning of the sentences,
sections, and paragraphs of a statute written in clear words may
still be ambiguous in application, as amply demonstrated by the
courts' struggles to apply the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
to McBoyle's long-ago theft of an airplane.
Statutory language may be plain yet ambiguous. 10 9 In
Kasischke v. State,110 for example, the Florida Supreme Court
held that "[t]he plain language of the statute could be construed
in at least four ways."' 11 The two dissenters wrote separately to
12
argue that the statute was unambiguous and its meaning plain,'
but it is just as plain that the Court as a whole could not find
clear meaning in statutory language prohibiting the possession
of porno raphy "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior
pattern."'
For that reason, the majority resorted to a variety of

105. See Alberto Manguel, A History of Reading 39 (Viking Penguin 1996) (quoting
Lewin C. Wittrock, Reading Comprehension, in Neuropsychological and Cognitive
Processes in Reading (Oxford U. Press 1981) for the insight that "readers attend to the
text. They create images and verbal transformations to represent its meaning. Most
impressively, they generate meaning as they read by constructing relations between their
knowledge, their memories of experience, and the written sentences, paragraphs and
passages").
106. Perrin v. U.S., 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975)).
107. NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.).
108. Id.
109. See generally Eric S. Lasky, Student Author, Perplexing Problems with Plain
Meaning,27 Hofstra L. Rev. 891 (1999).
110. 991 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2008).
111. Id. at 806.
112. Id. at 815-27 (Lewis, J., dissenting), 827-35 (Bell, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 805 (quoting statute).
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canons of construction, following the maxim that "if the

language of the statute
' 14 is unclear, then the rules of statutory
control."
construction
With statutes presenting clear language but multiple possible
interpretations, the dictionary ceases to determine meaning.
More sophisticated analysis is required, and context is king.
"Language, of course, cannot be interpreted apart from context.
The meaning of a word that appears ambiguous if viewed in
isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in light
of the terms that surround it.""' 5 And "in ascertaining the plain
meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular
statutory language at issue,
as well as the language and design of
6
the statute as a whole.""911
In this sense, "plain meaning" is a misnomer and is better
called "situational meaning." Even a stop sign does not mandate
a stop if a traffic officer standing beside it waves cars through
the intersection 1 17 or a driver speeds through the intersection
because his passenger is in cardiac arrest and requires immediate
attention in a hospital emergency room. If the plain meaning of
statutes were really so plain, would not the appellate opinions
explaining them be redundant? Would not the cases more

properly be decided by per curiam affirmance after per curiam
affirmance? Further, would not the losing parties be liable for
sanctions (the payment of costs or fees) for pursuing frivolous
appeals where plain meaning was, as the trial courts decided,
against the loser's position?
Of course, that is far from reality. How else does one
explain a five-to-four decision turning on words that appear to
be simple?" 8 The fact is that plain meaning is riddled with
exceptions and doubts:
In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States . . . this
Court conceded that a church's act of contracting with a
114. Id. at 811 (quoting Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432,435 (Fla. 2000)).
115. Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993); accord Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9
(2004).
116. Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (quoting Kmart
Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)).
117. See e.g. Fla. Stat. § 316.123(2)(a) (LEXIS 2009).
118. See e.g. Natl. Fedn. of Fed. Employees Loc. Union 1309 v. Dept. of Interior, 526
U.S. 86, 101 (1999) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court today ignores the plain
meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.").
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prospective rector fell within the plain meaning of a federal
labor statute, but nevertheless did not apply the statute to
the church: "It is a familiar rule," the Court pronounced,
"that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not
119 within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers."

Complicating the plain-meaning analysis is the
fragmentation among jurists regarding techniques of finding
statutory meaning. The previous section addressing the Supreme
Court's twists and turns in applying the rule of lenity
demonstrates the degree to which the Court has abandoned the
relatively mechanical but reliable common law approach
without developing an agreed-upon coherent approach to replace
it. With respect to the plain meaning canon, the justices likewise
cannot agree whether a putatively plain meaning should
foreclose consideration
of a statute's legislative history or other
1 20
sources.
extrinsic
Justice Scalia:
After all, "[a] statute is a statute," . . . and no matter how
"authoritative" the history may be ... one can never be
sure that the legislators who voted for the text of the bill
were aware of it. The only thing that was authoritatively
adopted for sure was the text of the enactment; the rest is
necessarily speculation.' 2

But Justice Souter's approach diverges: "Believers in plain
meaning might be excused for thinking that the text answers the
question. But history may have something to say about what is
plain, and here history is not silent."' 122 To similar effect is the
argument that the plain-meaning rule is "rather an axiom of
experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude
consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." 123 In fact,
119. Zuni PublicSchools Dist.No. 89 v. Dept. ofEduc., 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia,
Thomas & Souter JJ., and Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
120. See R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307-08 (Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
121. Id. at 309; see also Sarah Newland, Student Author, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory
Construction and the Rule ofLenity, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197 (1994).
122. U.S. v. Mezzanotto, 513 U.S. 196, 212 (1995) (Souter & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
123. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J., writing for
the majority); see also U.S. v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)
("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may
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it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary;
but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or
object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.124

III. CONCLUSION
The courts have long taken the position that statutes are, in
effect, to be read as one reads most texts, following dictionary
definitions (except for terms of art), and applying rules of
syntax, grammar, and punctuation where they work to produce a
sensible result-the most plausible interpretation of the
language in question. Excessive literalism is to be avoided.
Thus, courts should "disregard the punctuation, or repunctuate,
if need be, to render the true meaning of the statute. ' ' 25 And
why? Because "[s]tatutory construction is a holistic
endeavor 0,126 that must account for a statute's "object and
policy."' 17 This dichotomy bears an obvious parallel to the
divergence over the meaning and application of the rule of lenity
discussed above.
Often, plain meaning or statutory ambiguity ("grievous" or
otherwise) will be plain enough using common sense and
common understanding. But it is the hard cases, those that
justify a reasoned appellate opinion or second-tier review, that
truly illuminate the unavoidable judicial choices in the
decisionmaking process and the limited utility of the canons of
construction. In such cases, the search for plain meaning or
ambiguity devolves to a choice among competing options in the
hope of arriving at the most plausible meaning among the
several alternatives.

appear on 'superficial examination."') (quoting Helvering v. N.Y Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455
(1934)).
124. Cabellv. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
125. Hammock v. Loan & Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1882) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
126. United Say. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood ForestAssocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
127. U.S. v. Heirs ofBoisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849) (quoted in more than a
dozen cases).
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The advocate's job is to advance the interpretation of the
statute most beneficial to the client's position as the one that is
also most consistent with the common sense of the statute. Plain
meaning and other canons can facilitate that argument but not
decide it conclusively. As Dean Kronman reminds us,
Llewellyn stresses that cases cannot be decided merely by
identifying the controlling rules of law, the "paper" rules,
as he dismissively describes them. The decision of a case
always requires 128a choice among alternatives, hence an
exercise of will.
Hence,
to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the
construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by
means other than the use of the canon: The good sense of
the situation and a simple construction of the available
language to achieve 29
that sense, by tenable means, out of the
statutory language.1
Mutatis mutandis, the task for judges in the search for law
and justice in a case of statutory interpretation is ultimately the
same; and it is attainable by what Dean Kronman calls the
exercise of "sound judgment"' 30 by a jurist that'' 3Judge Posner
would characterize as a "constrained pragmatist." '

128. Kronman, supra n. 100, at 196 (footnote omitted).
129. Llewellyn, supra n. 100, at 521 (emphasis in original).
130. Kronman, supra n. 100, at 231-32 (attributing the term to Judge Posner).

131. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 230 (Harvard U. Press 2008).

